Research

Research

Publications in Peer-Reviewed Journals

Rage Against the Machine? Generative AI Exposure, Subjective Risk, and Policy Preferences, forthcoming, Journal of European Public Policy.
(with Jasmine Bhatia and Jane Gingrich)

Abstract

How does novel technology change public policy demands? Scholars interested in the effect of automation on policy preferences have commonly argued that exposure to automation technology increases subjective risk, which in turn predicts demand for insurance. Generative AI potentially challenges this dynamic. Based on a pre-registered online experiment with a sample of 1,041 UK working-age adults we show that direct exposure to generative AI in realistic work tasks does not increase subjective risk but does strengthen support for activating social policy. To understand this constellation of attitudes, we argue that exposure to technology may activate sociotropic preferences to support individuals who might be negatively affected by AI. Text analysis shows cautious optimism and thoughtful engagement with the implications of AI for work and social policy. Our findings suggest that the current uncertainty over the relative winners and losers from AI opens a window of opportunity to expand activating social policies.

Yesterday’s Model for Tomorrow’s Economy? Dual VET and Wage Inequality in the Knowledge Economy, 2025, Journal of European Social Policy.
(with Patrick Emmenegger)
Dual VET Dataset

Abstract

Dual vocational education and training (VET) is said to have positive economic effects. However, recent contributions suggest that the rise of the knowledge economy may undermine these positive effects because university-educated workers are better suited for the new knowledge-intensive jobs. This paper provides the first evidence on the relationship between dual VET and wage inequality in mature knowledge economies. Using a new dataset on 37 advanced economies from 1996 to 2020, we find that dual VET is associated with lower levels of wage inequality. This negative association is particularly strong in the lower half of the wage distribution, which suggests that academically weaker students are the main beneficiaries of dual VET. Using three different indicators of the knowledge economy, we find, contrary to the fears often espoused in the literature, no clear evidence that the knowledge economy erodes this negative association between dual VET and wage inequality.

Subjective Technology Risk and Education Preferences: VET as a Safe Haven or Dead End?, 2025, Regulation & Governance.
(with Scherwin Bajka)

Abstract

Education equips individuals with valuable skills to protect them against employment risks associated with the digital transition. As scholars debate whether vocational education and training (VET) or general education better insures against technology-induced employment risk, we ask how this type of risk, as perceived by individuals, shapes their education preferences. Our analyses, based on a survey of over 11,500 respondents across seven European countries, show that VET is regarded as a safe haven by those perceiving heightened risk. This relationship remains robust when controlling for various alternative explanations and is consistent across countries. Subgroup interactions indicate that men, high-income earners, respondents with tertiary education, and those politically on the right more strongly favor VET in response to subjective technology risk. Hence, our study suggests that VET's practical, job-oriented focus is perceived as better protection against the growing uncertainty over skill demands in the twin transition than general education.

Why Is It So Hard to Counteract Wealth Inequality? Evidence from the United Kingdom, 2025, World Politcs 77(3), 515-561.
(with Ben Ansell, Laure Bokobza, Asli Cansunar, Mads Elkjaer, and Jacob Nyrup)
Replication Data

Abstract

It has long been established that education and income affect people's political efficacy. Surprisingly, the role of wealth has been largely neglected in this literature. In this paper, we argue that housing wealth performs an insurance function and is thereby associated with higher internal and external political efficacy. Using data from the UKHLS and a representative survey including an experiment that was administered in England and Wales, we document a sizeable and statistically significant positive association of housing wealth and perceived wealth with efficacy. However, this relationship is less robust to sample attrition than between efficacy and education or income. We furthermore investigate whether informing respondents about house price inequality affects their efficacy. Our information treatments show no effect on external efficacy, while the effect on internal efficacy depends on the respondent correctly understanding the information: comprehenders show higher efficacy and non-comprehenders exhibit lower efficacy, compared to the control group. This suggests that views of government responsiveness (external efficacy) are not easily manipulated, while for people's view of their own understanding of politics (internal efficacy), comprehension matters more than content of the information treatment, in accordance with self-efficacy theory.

Center-right Parties and Post-War Secondary Education, 2023, Comparative Politics 55(2), 193-218.
(with Jane Gingrich, Anja Giudici, and Tom Chevalier)

Abstract

The massification of secondary schooling constitutes the key educational project of the first post-war period. However, the resulting educational structures differed in terms of streaming and standardisation. Despite their historical opposition, center-right parties contributed to shaping these reforms. They opposed standardisation because their distributive strategy rested on support from elites and middle classes. However, their stance on streaming varied. Centre-right parties supported streaming when they were linked to teachers and private providers who opposed comprehensive reforms, but supported de-streaming where such groups aligned with the left. The analysis suggests that common partisan distributive aims can materialize as varied public service reforms, due their intersection with the productive environment. This paper shows these outcomes by tracing reforms shaped by center-right parties in Bavaria, France, and Italy.

Rethinking the measurement of occupational task content, 2022, The Economic and Labour Relations Review 33(1), 178-199.
Replication Data

Abstract

Which tasks workers perform on their jobs is critical for how technological change plays out in the labour market. This crucial insight sparked a large literature on routine-biased technological change which argues that routine occupations with a high share of repetitive and codifiable tasks are at risk of being automated. This paper makes the case for rethinking how we operationalise occupational task content. Based on survey data from 27 European countries between 2000 and 2015, I construct novel measures of routine task intensity and task complexity at the ISCO-88 2-digit level. Comparing them to existing operationalisations, I show that the proposed indices lead to improvements in several critical areas. The task dimensions have a straightforward theoretical interpretation as they capture the essence of the routine-bias and skill-bias arguments and are operationalised to better align theory and measurement. Furthermore, my indices create new opportunities for research by allowing researchers to analyse within-occupation change and country-differences in occupational task content. My paper can therefore contribute to a more sociologically informed understanding of technological change. The indices will benefit both sociologists and labour economists in investigating the nature of recent employment trends in Europe and formulating policies to deal with these challenges.

Routine-biased technological change does not always lead to polarisation: Evidence from 10 OECD countries, 1995–2013, 2021, Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 74 (August 2021).

Abstract

This article deals with a central paradox in the occupational polarisation literature: most scholars accept that technological change is biased against routine-intensive occupations, but in many countries, we do not see the pattern of occupational polarisation that the theory usually predicts. I argue and show empirically using a dataset of 10 OECD countries between 1995 and 2013 that technological change is both routine-biased and skill-biased, but that the result of routine-biased technological change may be occupational upgrading rather than polar- isation. This is due to differences in occupational routine-wage hierarchies: only where routine occupations cluster around the middle of the wage distribution are we likely to see polarisation. Where routine occupations are concentrated near the bottom of the wage hierarchy, upgrading occupational change is the norm. Based on research on the US, the former has been widely assumed, but it does not hold true in all countries. Overall, this article shows that much previous work on routine-biased technological change and polarisation was built on premises that do not travel well. This underscores the importance of comparative research for building and testing robust general theories.

Working Papers

No Great Equalizer: Experimental Evidence on Productivity Effects of Generative AI Use in the UK Labor Market
(with Jane Gingrich and Jasmine Bhatia; under review at Research Policy)

Abstract

An emerging consensus holds that generative artificial intelligence (AI) equalizes workers’ performance within tasks, reducing productivity differences across workers. Existing research has largely studied productivity within single occupational groups and task structures. Whether this equalizing pattern generalizes to the labor market at large remains unclear. Observed performance equalization within groups of workers is compatible with both increasing and decreasing inequality between groups. To distinguish these outcomes, we conducted a large pre-registered online experiment with a sample of the UK working age population which randomly assigned participants to treatments that encouraged or discouraged the use of ChatGPT and then asked them to complete a set of realistic work tasks. We find that ChatGPT use increased productivity in all tasks, with greater benefits observed in more complex and less ambiguous tasks. However, compression effects between tasks were limited. Moreover, ChatGPT use did not affect productivity differentials between gender, age, educational or occupational groups.

The Missing Link: Technological Change, Dual VET, and Social Policy Preferences
(with Patrick Emmenegger and Niccolo Durazzi; under review at British Journal of Political Science)

Abstract

How does technological change affect social policy preferences? We advance this lively debate by focusing on the role of dual vocational education and training (VET). Existing literature would lead us to expect that dual VET increases demand for compensatory social policy and magnifies the effect of automation risk on such demands. In contrast, we contend that dual VET weakens demand for compensatory social policy through three non-mutually exclusive mechanisms that we refer to as (i) material self-interest; (ii) workplace socialization; and (iii) skill certification. We further hypothesize that dual VET mitigates the effect of automation risk on social policy preferences. Analyzing cross-national individual data from the European Social Survey and national-level data on education systems, we find strong evidence for our argument. The paper advances the debate on social policy preferences in the age of automation and sheds new light on the relationship between skill specificity and social policy preferences.

Wealth Tax Preferences in an Age of Inequality: The Role of Housing and Information
(with Ben Ansell and Mads Elkjaer)

Abstract

Despite high and rising levels of wealth inequality, wealth taxes have been reduced in many countries. While existing explanations focus on structural factors, we argue that public opposition to wealth taxes among homeowners has contributed to creating a political playing field that facilitates low wealth taxes. This opposition is aided by information asymmetries, which prevent low-wealth renters from formulating preferences that align with their material self-interest. Utilizing original survey data from Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, we find empirical support for our thesis. Housing wealth increases the likelihood of stating a preference on wealth taxation, and homeowners and their children support less progressive taxation of inheritances, wealth, and capital gains. The paper helps us understand why, despite pronounced inequality in asset ownership, wealth taxation has fallen out of favor among democratically elected governments.

Housing and Political Efficacy
(with Mads Elkjaer and Ben Ansell; under review at West European Politics)

Abstract

It has long been established that education and income affect people's political efficacy. Surprisingly, the role of wealth - in particular, housing wealth - has thus far been ignored in this literature. We theorise that housing performs several functions that increase political efficacy and test our arguments using data from three large representative surveys administered in the UK. We first argue that housing wealth provides a form of "self-insurance", which on the one hand facilitates civic engagement, and on the other hand raises people's stakes in the political process. In line with this argument, we find that homeowners, owners of more valuable houses, owners who have paid off their mortgage, and individuals who believe themselves to be higher in the housing wealth distribution all exhibit higher efficacy. Based on the literature on status expectations and the politics of resentment, we furthermore investigate whether intergenerational housing mobility affects political efficacy. However, we find no evidence that upward or downward intergenerational housing mobility affects efficacy beyond the first-order effect of homeownership. Finally, we study whether stronger local ties explain the higher efficacy of homeowners. Again, however, we find no evidence that length of tenancy in the area affects homeowners and renters differently. The results of this study show that housing - and by extension wealth more generally - constitutes a hitherto neglected but crucial determinant of political efficacy, chiefly by providing security which enables and incentivises engagement.

Caught in a Downward Spiral? The Relative Attractiveness Deficit of Vocational Education and Training
(with Patrick Emmenegger and Anna Wilson; under review at Sociology of Education)

Abstract

Vocational education and training (VET) has been hailed as a way to address skills shortages and facilitate social inclusion. Consequently, VET policy initiatives have proliferated in recent years. However, little is known about the factors influencing the choice between VET and general education. In this study, we examine the attractiveness of VET in seven European countries using a vignette experiment with over 11,000 respondents. Respondents were asked to assign fictitious 15-year-olds to either VET or general education based on achieved (performance in school and motivation) and ascribed characteristics (sociodemographic variables). Our findings show that respondents recommend students with low grades and little motivation to pursue VET. These effects weaken, but do not disappear, among respondents who favor VET in terms of future labor market outcomes. Additionally, we find that boys, working-class students, and students from outside big cities are advised to pursue VET. However, the effect of achievement is more important than the effect of ascription. These patterns are consistent across countries and subgroups, suggesting that VET is widely perceived as the less attractive choice. Our findings suggest that VET is caught in a downward spiral in which the relative unattractiveness of VET and academic drift reinforce each other.

Work in Progress

Striking the Balance? Firms’ Training Strategies in Response to Generative AI

Abstract

Practical learning from experts is key to the mastery of almost any job. It constitutes the backbone of collective skill formation systems and is equally crucial in systems emphasising on-the-job learning. Yet, generative AI threatens the complementary relationship between master and apprentice, senior and junior worker: tasks performed by entry-level workers with limited experience tend to be particularly exposed to substitution by AI. If these positions are replaced, skill development is impeded and overall workforce skill levels are likely to suffer in the medium- to long-term. This creates a dilemma for profit-maximising firms: automation may boost short-term productivity at the expense of long-term productivity growth. This paper studies how firms in Germany and the US navigate this challenge. Building on the Varieties of Capitalism literature, I argue that differences such as higher employee turnover and a greater emphasis on shareholder value incentivise American firms to prioritise AI adoption, while German firms maintain a stronger focus on training younger workers even if it means foregoing short-term gains. I test this argument empirically using data on job openings in sectors that are exposed to or sheltered from AI. This allows me to trace differential rates of change between the groups of occupations and across countries in a) the balance between junior and senior vacancies and b) the task composition of junior roles. Empirical support for my argument highlights a hitherto underappreciated potential long-term consequence of generative AI that may undermine its productivity-enhancing effects.

Social Protection in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: How Do People Reason?
(with Jasmine Bhatia, Patrick Emmenegger, and Jane Gingrich)

Experimental Evidence on Perceptions of Inequality and Tax Preferences
(with Mads Elkjaer)